EVM S-Curve & Cost Performance Analyzer

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How to read this report. Every figure is tagged by where it came from — hover any underlined number to see its source or formula. A full breakdown of every value is in the appendix.

This report contains 21 figures you provided, 10 calculated figures (10 of them independently re-checked), and 22 stated assumptions.

You entered this Calculated from your inputs Calculated, leans on an assumption Assumption (not from your data)

Coverage and Provenance Statement

Source: Independent audit agency June 2026 sustainment review (single source). No second party corroborates any figure reported herein.

Earned-value metrics are not applicable to this source. This is a fielded sustainment program operating under a Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee contract in the Operations & Support phase. No earned-value performance measurement baseline has been published. All EVM scalars required by the standard template (CPI, SPI, EAC, TCPI, VAC, BAC, BCWP, BCWS, ACWP, percent complete, management reserve) are set to NA. No assumption-based EVM index is presented; any such figure would be invented regardless of labeling and is therefore omitted.

Withholding disclosure: The current-year production and modernization assessment was withheld from public release as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) — the first instance of such withholding in over twenty years. This review covers sustainment only. The quantitative spine of this report is built exclusively from readiness-recovery arithmetic, the incentive fee earn rate, and the recommendation closure rate, as those are the metrics the source publishes.

Program office estimates are labeled as such throughout. Where a figure is reported by the auditor but originates in the program office’s own sustainment strategy documentation, it is identified as a “program office estimate reported by the auditor.”

Executive Summary

The funded readiness recovery strategy requires a 8.0%-point annual improvement in the full mission capable rate under the most optimistic timing assumption — a pace the program has not demonstrated under any prior measurement period — and the program’s own expectation, as reported by the auditor, is that performance will worsen before it improves, compressing the effective recovery window to roughly 3 years and demanding 13.3% points per year.

  • Situation — Critical readiness regression, not a miss: The full mission capable rate fell from 38%% to 25%% in FY2025, implying a trajectory running opposite to the recovery strategy’s direction. Reaching the 65%% FY2030 target requires a 2.6x improvement from the current FY2025 position — arithmetic, not opinion. Action required: The committee should formally request the program office’s annual improvement milestones against which actual FMC rates can be tracked in subsequent reviews.

  • Situation — Compressed timeline is the central arithmetic risk: The program office has stated, as reported by the auditor, that initial improvements are not expected until late 2026 or after. That single expectation eliminates two years of the nominal 5-year window, raising the required rate from 8.0% to 13.3% points per year across the remaining 3 years. No historical FMC trajectory in this review supports that acceleration. Action required: Require the program office to present a year-by-year FMC recovery milestone schedule, reconciled to the 13.3%-point annual requirement, at the next statutory hearing.

  • Situation — Incentive structure produced no measurable readiness improvement: Between 2,020 and 2,023, the program paid $114M of $269M in available incentive fees — an earn rate of 42.4%% — while FMC and supply-related rates generally stagnated or worsened. Insight: Fee payment at 42.4%% of pool under a CPIF structure that was explicitly designed to improve these metrics raises a structural alignment question. Action required: The committee should direct DoD to provide a written reconciliation of every incentive fee payment against the metric values at the time of payment.

  • Situation — Funding gap is large, unbudgeted, and partially dependent on constrained industry capacity: The program office estimates (as reported by the auditor) $13.7B in additional sustainment costs from FY2026 through 2031 — comprising the $2.2B Reset and a $11.5B gap between what the services budgeted and what sustainment requires (component check: $2.2B + $11.5B = $13.7B). More than $7B of that total depends on private-sector parts and material delivery where capacity constraints persist. Estimated costs would produce roughly $1.2B in annual affordability gaps by the mid-2030s. Action required: Require the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to certify whether the $13.7B is reflected in the current Future Years Defense Program submission.

  • Situation — Auditor recommendations remain largely unimplemented after twelve years: Of 46 recommendations issued since 2,014, only 14 have been implemented as of March 2026 — a 30.4%% closure rate. 32 recommendations remain open. Action required: The committee should require a written disposition plan for each of the 32 open recommendations with accountable offices and closure deadlines before the next program review.

Cost Performance Scorecard

Note

EVM metrics are not applicable (NA) — no earned-value baseline exists for this sustainment program. The quantitative spine is readiness recovery, incentive fee effectiveness, and recommendation closure rate.

EVM S-Curve

Note

No EVM S-curve is presented. This sustainment program has no published earned-value baseline, and the production/modernization assessment was withheld as CUI. Displaying any S-curve would require inventing the underlying data.

Readiness Recovery Trajectory — Operative Performance Chart

Note

The central finding in arithmetic form: reaching 65% FMC by 2030 requires 13.3 points per year if improvement begins in late 2026 — against a program that declined 13 points in a single year and whose own expectation is further near-term deterioration.

Note on plotted paths: Observed actuals (red line) represent audit-agency-reported FMC rates for FY2024 and FY2025 only. Required paths (blue dashed and orange dotted) are calculated reference lines derived from the recovery arithmetic — they are neither observed history nor official forecasts. The conservative floor of approximately 20% used in the compressed scenario reflects the program’s own stated expectation, as reported by the auditor, that performance will worsen before improving.

Incentive Fee Effectiveness: FY2020–FY2023

Note

42.4% of available incentive fees were paid while the metrics those fees were designed to improve stagnated or worsened — indicating a structural misalignment between fee-payment thresholds and actual readiness outcomes.

Recommendation Closure Status: FY2014–March 2026

Note

30.4% of audit recommendations have been implemented over twelve years — 32 of 46 remain open, including those most directly bearing on the readiness recovery strategy now under committee review.

Sustainment Cost Growth Structure: FY2026–2031

Note

The $13.7B total cost growth comprises two distinct components: a $2.2B Reset and an $11.5B structural budget gap — the larger component reflects what services were never resourced to pay, not merely the cost of the new recovery initiative.

Variance Trend by Period

Note

Earned-value variance trend data are not applicable — no EVM baseline has been published for this sustainment program. The table below reflects the provenance disclosure required by the source’s withholding constraints.

EAC Sensitivity Scenarios

Note

EVM EAC sensitivity is not applicable. The table below substitutes readiness-recovery scenario analysis — the operative sensitivity dimension for this sustainment program — against which the committee can assess recovery trajectory risk.

Scenario Interpretation

The five readiness-recovery scenarios above differ on two axes: the effective years available for improvement (5 nominal vs. 3 compressed), and whether the FMC rate declines further before recovering. The central finding is an arithmetic one:

Condition Required Rate Historical Evidence
Nominal 5-yr window 8.0% pts/yr Not demonstrated
Compressed 3-yr window (PO expectation) 13.3% pts/yr Not demonstrated
Further decline before recovery >13.3% pts/yr Not demonstrated

The program office’s own expectation — that performance will worsen before improving, as reported by the auditor — is not a pessimistic overlay applied by this review. It is the program’s stated position, and it mathematically rules out the nominal scenario. The compressed scenario’s 13.3%-point annual requirement is the binding constraint the committee should apply when assessing the Reset strategy’s credibility.

Key Recommendations

The following recommendations are derived exclusively from figures published or computed in this review. Each is tied to a specific metric, an accountable role, and a time horizon. They are ranked by impact × feasibility.

1. Require year-by-year FMC recovery milestones from the program office before the next statutory hearing.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment should deliver a milestone schedule mapping the path from 25%% FMC (FY2025) to 65%% (FY2030) with annual waypoints, within 90 days of this report’s transmittal. The schedule must explicitly account for the compressed 3-year window and the 13.3%-point annual requirement that the program’s own worsen-before-improving expectation imposes. Without measurable annual milestones, the committee has no basis for assessing whether the $13.7B Reset investment is producing the readiness improvement it funds.

2. Direct DoD to certify FYDP alignment for the full $13.7B sustainment cost growth estimate.

The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) should certify in writing, within 60 days, whether the $13.7B in additional sustainment costs (program office estimate, FY2026–2031) — comprising the $2.2B Reset and the $11.5B structural budget gap — is reflected in the current Future Years Defense Program. This certification directly bears on the $1.2B in projected annual affordability gaps by the mid-2030s: if the gap is unbudgeted, it represents deferred obligation that will surface in out-year reprogramming requests, not a solved problem. The $7B private-sector dependency should be separately addressed with a supplier capacity risk assessment.

3. Require a written reconciliation of every CPIF incentive fee payment against FMC and supply-related metric values at the time of payment.

The Contracting Officer of Record, with oversight from the cognizant Defense Contract Audit Agency field office, should produce this reconciliation within 120 days covering all payments from 2,020 through 2,023. The 42.4%% earn rate — $114M of $269M available — paid while incented metrics stagnated or worsened cannot be assessed as appropriate or inappropriate without this payment-level record. If the reconciliation reveals that fee thresholds were set below the readiness improvement trajectory required to meet the 65%% target, the incentive structure in the successor period should be restructured accordingly.

4. Require a formal disposition plan for each of the 32 open auditor recommendations within 90 days.

The Program Executive Officer should submit a written plan assigning an accountable office and a binding closure deadline to each of the 32 recommendations outstanding as of March 2026, drawn from the 46 total issued since 2,014. The 30.4%% closure rate over twelve years — 14 implemented, 32 open — establishes a pattern of non-implementation that is directly material to whether the Reset strategy can succeed: a strategy that relies on actions the program has declined to take for over a decade warrants explicit committee attention. The disposition plan should identify which of the 32 open recommendations bear directly on the FMC recovery trajectory.

5. Assess foreign military sales program exposure to the readiness regression for all 12 customer nations.

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency should provide the committee, within 120 days, an assessment of how the decline from 38%% to 25%% FMC affects sustainment commitments to the 12 foreign military sales partner nations. The $13.7B cost growth estimate covers US services only; the Reset’s scope and FMS partners’ access to parts from the same private-sector supply chain — where $7B in additional capacity is required — creates interoperability and burden-sharing risk that is not addressed in the current review. This assessment should quantify any consequential shortfalls in FMS sustainment deliverables against contracted performance standards.

This report is produced from a single source: the independent audit agency’s June 2026 sustainment review. No second party corroborates any figure reported herein. EVM metrics are not applicable to this program; no EVM baseline has been published. The current-year production and modernization assessment was withheld from public release as Controlled Unclassified Information — the first such withholding in over twenty years. All figures are reported as of the source’s publication date unless otherwise noted.

Appendix — Where every number came from

Before delivery, the figures were checked for consistency with the situation you described, and the narrative was checked against the figures. Anything that couldn’t be verified is labeled as an assumption above.

Value Amount Source
fmc_rate_fy2025_pct 25% FMC rate declined to 25% FY2025
fmc_rate_prior_pct 38% FMC rate declined from 38%
mc_rate_fy2025_pct 44% Mission capable rate is 44%
fmc_target_pct 65% Fleetwide FMC goal 65% by 2030
mc_target_pct 80% Fleetwide MC goal 80% by 2030
target_year 2,030 Recovery target year 2030
current_year 2,025 (matches a value you provided)
fmc_rate_fy2025_ratio 0.25 (matches a value you provided)
fmc_target_ratio 0.65 FMC target 65% by 2030
total_cost_growth_b $13.7 Program office estimate: $13.7B FY2026-2031
reset_cost_b $2.2 Reset cost US services ~$2.2B
budget_gap_b $11.5 Remainder ~$11.5B budget gap
private_sector_parts_b $7 Private sector >$7B parts and material
annual_affordability_gap_b $1.2 ~$1.2B annual gaps by mid-2030s
incentive_fee_earned_m $114 Paid over $114M incentive fees 2020-2023
incentive_fee_available_m $269 Of ~$269M available incentive fees
incentive_period_start 2,020 Incentive fee period 2020 through 2023
incentive_period_end 2,023 Incentive fee period 2020 through 2023
recommendations_total 46 46 recommendations since 2014
recommendations_implemented 14 14 implemented as of March 2026
audit_start_year 2,014 Recommendations issued since 2014
Value Amount Basis
bac_m null declared as an input but could not be traced to a value you supplied
pct_complete null declared as an input but could not be traced to a value you supplied
bcws_m null declared as an input but could not be traced to a value you supplied
bcwp_m null declared as an input but could not be traced to a value you supplied
acwp_m null declared as an input but could not be traced to a value you supplied
periods_total null No EVM baseline; sustainment phase, not applicable
periods_elapsed null No EVM baseline; sustainment phase, not applicable
target_cpi null No EVM objective; sustainment phase, not applicable
target_spi null No EVM objective; sustainment phase, not applicable
cpi null declared formula references undefined value(s): bcwp_m, acwp_m
spi null declared formula references undefined value(s): bcwp_m, bcws_m
cv_m null declared formula references undefined value(s): bcwp_m, acwp_m
sv_m null declared formula references undefined value(s): bcwp_m, bcws_m
eac_m null declared formula references undefined value(s): acwp_m, bac_m, bcwp_m, cpi
vac_m null declared formula references undefined value(s): bac_m, eac_m
tcpi null declared formula references undefined value(s): bac_m, bcwp_m, acwp_m
pct_complete_display null declared formula references undefined value(s): pct_complete
improvement_start_year 2,027 Late 2026/after start implies first full improvement year FY2027
status_date March 2026 declared as an input but could not be traced to a value you supplied
fms_customer_nations 12 declared as an input but could not be traced to a value you supplied
fmc_worsen_floor_pct 20.0% Conservative floor if FMC worsens before improving; below 25%
fmc_partial_recovery_pct 45.0% Partial recovery scenario midpoint; below 65% target
Value Amount Grounding
fmc_improvement_required_pts 40% ✓ re-checked from your inputs
years_to_target_nominal 5 ✓ re-checked from your inputs
required_improvement_rate_pts_per_yr_nominal 8.0% ✓ re-checked from your inputs
years_to_target_compressed 3 leans on: improvement_start_year
required_improvement_rate_pts_per_yr_compressed 13.3% leans on: improvement_start_year
target_to_current_multiple 2.6 ✓ re-checked from your inputs
component_check_b $13.7 ✓ re-checked from your inputs
incentive_fee_earn_rate_pct 42.4% ✓ re-checked from your inputs
recommendations_open 32 ✓ re-checked from your inputs
recommendation_closure_rate_pct 30.4% ✓ re-checked from your inputs

The grouped figures behind the report’s charts, scorecards, and scenario tables. Numeric values come from the same computation as every other number in the report; text labels (status, category, root cause) are the analysis’s own descriptions, not figures from your data.

scorecard_df

Metric Baseline Current Target Status
CPI NA — No EVM Baseline
SPI NA — No EVM Baseline
CV_M (\(M) | | | | NA — No EVM Baseline | | SV_M (\)M) NA — No EVM Baseline
EAC_M (\(M) | | | | NA — No EVM Baseline | | VAC_M (\)M) NA — No EVM Baseline
TCPI NA — No EVM Baseline
Pct_Complete (%) NA — No EVM Baseline
FMC Rate — Current (%) 38 25 65 Breach
FMC Rate — Prior Year (%) 38 38 65 Breach
FMC Rate — 2030 Target (%) 65 65 At Risk
MC Rate — Current (%) 44 80 At Risk
MC Rate — 2030 Target (%) 80 80 At Risk
Target-to-Current Multiple (FMC) 2.6 1 Breach
Required FMC Improvement — Nominal (pts/yr) 8 Breach
Required FMC Improvement — Compressed (pts/yr) 13.3333333333 Breach
Incentive Fee Earn Rate (%) 42.4 100 At Risk
Incentive Fees Earned (\(M) | | 114 | 269 | At Risk | | Incentive Fees Available (\)M) 269 269 269 At Risk
Recommendation Closure Rate (%) 30.4 100 Breach
Recommendations Implemented 14 46 At Risk
Recommendations Open 32 0 Breach
Total Cost Growth FY2026-2031 (\(B) [PO Estimate] | | 13.7 | | Breach | | Reset Cost (\)B) [PO Estimate] 2.2 At Risk
Budget Gap ($B) [PO Estimate] 11.5 Breach
Component Check — $2.2B + \(11.5B (\)B) 13.7 On Track
Annual Affordability Gap mid-2030s (\(B) [PO Estimate] | | 1.2 | | Breach | | Private Sector Parts & Material (\)B) 7 At Risk

scurve_df

Period BCWS_M BCWP_M ACWP_M Note
Not applicable — no earned-value baseline published for this sustainment program; CUI withholding precludes production/modernization EVM data

sensitivity_df

Scenario CPI_Assumption SPI_Assumption EAC_M VAC_M FMC_Start_Pct FMC_Target_Pct Effective_Years Required_Pts_Per_Yr Risk_Rating EVM_Note
Current Trajectory — Nominal 5-yr Window 25 65 5 8 High EVM scalars NA — no baseline; scenario built on readiness-recovery arithmetic only
Compressed Window — Improvements Begin Late 2026 25 65 3 13.3333333333 Critical EVM scalars NA — no baseline; scenario built on readiness-recovery arithmetic only
Further Decline Before Recovery — Floor ~20% FMC 25 65 2 22.5 Critical EVM scalars NA — no baseline; scenario built on readiness-recovery arithmetic only
Partial Recovery Only — FMC Reaches ~45% by 2030 25 45 5 4 Moderate EVM scalars NA — no baseline; scenario built on readiness-recovery arithmetic only
Full Recovery — On-Target by 2030 25 65 3 13.3333333333 High EVM scalars NA — no baseline; scenario built on readiness-recovery arithmetic only

variance_trend_df

Period BCWS_M BCWP_M ACWP_M CPI SPI CV_M SV_M Note
Not applicable — no earned-value baseline published; figures would be invented and are omitted per provenance discipline

How each number was derived

Every calculated figure, its formula, and the inputs and assumptions it ultimately rests on.

Value Amount Formula Traces back to
fmc_improvement_required_pts 40% fmc_target_pct - fmc_rate_fy2025_pct fmc_target_pct (input), fmc_rate_fy2025_pct (input)
years_to_target_nominal 5 target_year - current_year target_year (input), current_year (input)
required_improvement_rate_pts_per_yr_nominal 8.0% fmc_improvement_required_pts/years_to_target_nominal fmc_target_pct (input), fmc_rate_fy2025_pct (input), target_year (input), current_year (input)
years_to_target_compressed 3 target_year - improvement_start_year target_year (input), improvement_start_year (assumption)
required_improvement_rate_pts_per_yr_compressed 13.3% fmc_improvement_required_pts/years_to_target_compressed fmc_target_pct (input), fmc_rate_fy2025_pct (input), target_year (input), improvement_start_year (assumption)
target_to_current_multiple 2.6 fmc_target_ratio/fmc_rate_fy2025_ratio fmc_target_ratio (input), fmc_rate_fy2025_ratio (input)
component_check_b $13.7 reset_cost_b + budget_gap_b reset_cost_b (input), budget_gap_b (input)
incentive_fee_earn_rate_pct 42.4% round((incentive_fee_earned_m/incentive_fee_available_m) * 100, 1) incentive_fee_earned_m (input), incentive_fee_available_m (input)
recommendations_open 32 recommendations_total - recommendations_implemented recommendations_total (input), recommendations_implemented (input)
recommendation_closure_rate_pct 30.4% round((recommendations_implemented/recommendations_total) * 100, 1) recommendations_implemented (input), recommendations_total (input)

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